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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATB OP U'l'AB 
INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CREDIT 
CORPORATION 1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
PIONEER TRACTOR & IMPLEMENT, 
INC., WAYNE A. SCHOENFELD 
and DORA C. SCHOENFELD, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 16250 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was filed by International Harvester 
Credit Corporation to recover amounts due from Pioneer 
Tractor and Implement, Inc., a former International Harvester 
dealer, and from the two owners of the business who person-
ally guaranteed the obligations of the corporate defendant 
to the Plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried to the Court, the Honorable 
J. Robert Bullock, District Judge presiding. At the 
conclusion of the trial the Court asked the parties to 
submit memoranda summarizing their respective positions and 
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dealing with certain issues which had arisen during the 
course of the trial. Thereafter the Court prepared a 
Decision and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and a Judgment which are generally favorable to the 
position of the Plaintiff. A motion to amend or, in the 
alternative, for a new trial was filed, considered and 
denied and, in due course, a notice of appeal was filed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent seeks affirmance of the Judgment 
entered by the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts contained in the Appellan~' 
brief is confusing and somewhat misleading and thus the 
Respondent feels an obligation to state the facts as it 
finds them. 
On December 1, 1975, an Agreement (Exhibit 1) was 
entered into between International Harvester Company 
(hereinafter "IHC") and Pioneer Tractor and Implement, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Pioneer") establishing Pioneer as an Inter-
national Harvester Farm Equipment Dealer. In connection 
with the establishment of the dealership, additional agree-
ments were entered into providing for various kinds of 
financing by International Harvester Credit Corporation 
-2-
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(Exhibits 2 and 3) and for a personal guarantee of the 
obligations of the corporate dealer by Wayne A. Schoenfeld 
and Dora C. Schoenfeld (Exhibits 4 and 5). 
International Harvester Credit Corporation 
(hereinafter "IHCC") offered and Pioneer made use of several 
different kinds of financing assistance, including: 
1. Floor plan financing for new and used vehicles. 
Pioneer was required to sign wholesale notes 
covering the separate pieces of equipment and 
each month it received a Wholesale Note and 
Inventory Statement summarizing the status of 
the various notes (R. 180, 181). Notes 
covering specific pieces of equipment became 
due when the items were "resold, leased or 
placed in use" (Exhibit 1, §11). 
2. Open account financing on routine transactions 
with IHC. Parts purchases, interest charges, 
freight costs, warranty credits and other 
such transactions between IHC and Pioneer were 
handled through an open account (R. 181, 182, 
212, 213). Once a month the balance in the 
open account was purchased by IHCC from IHC 
and Pioneer was then given until the 15th of 
the following month to pay the open account 
-3-
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balance (R. 182, 183). 
3. Purchasing of retail contracts on sales made 
by Pioneer. "Exhibit E", which is part of 
Exhibit 2, sets forth the agreement of the 
parties with respect to such purchases and 
provides for the establishment of a reserve 
account to be held by IHCC during the period 
that retail contracts are being financed. 
Pioneer operated for a fairly short time as an 
International Harvester dealer. Early in August of 1976 
representatives of IHC were notified verbally (R. 257) and ir 
writing (Exhibit 6) of the intention of the dealer to 
resign. The Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (Exhibit 1) 
contains very specific provisions (§29) dealing with the 
termination of a dealer and the outlined procedures were 
thereafter followed by IHC and IHCC in disposing of the part 
and farm equipment inventory of Pioneer. Representatives 
of Pioneer were consulted and kept informed as the parts 
and equipment were being processed (R. 204, 259-262). 
Credits generated by the sale of the parts and 
equipment inventory to other dealers and, where this was 
not possible, back to IHC, were applied to the various 
obligations of Pioneer to IHCC (R. 211) and this action was 
initiated to recover the remaining balance. 
-4-
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Delbert L. Homestead, the District Operations 
Manager for IHCC, testified in detail with respect to the 
procedure followed after the resignation of Pioneer as an 
International Harvester dealer. In accordance with Rule 70(1) 
(f) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, he was also permitted 
to summarize the numerous bookkeeping entries and accounts 
and testify as to the amount owing by the Appellants to 
IHCC (R. 212-214), including interest (R. 216, 217). The 
Judgment entered by the Court (R. 19) is consistent with 
the testimony of Mr. Homestead. 
There was conflicting evidence during the course 
of the trial with respect to certain charges to the Pioneer 
account which were included in the amount claimed by IHCC. 
After hearing the testimony of the witnesses and considering 
the arguments and memoranda submitted by the parties, the 
Trial Court found that the charges to the account were 
proper and justified under the circumstances (R. 24) . 
The Appellants filed a Counterclaim against IHCC 
and a Third Party Claim against IHC contending that they 
were misled in connection with the opening of the dealer-
ship and the subsequent ordering of inventory. The Trial 
Court concluded that the Appellants had failed to meet 
their burden of proving actionable misconduct on the part 
of IHCC or IHC (R. 26) and dismissed the Counterclaim and 
Third Party Claim (R. 20). 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN PERMITTING 
THE RESPONDENT'S WITNESS TO SUMMARIZE THE 
VOLUMINOUS ACCOUNTS AND OTHER RECORDS 
AND STATE HIS CONCLUSION WITH RESPECT 
TO THE AMOUNTS OWING BY THE APPELLANTS 
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, Delbert L. 
Homestead, the Respondent's District Operations Manager, 
was permitted to summarize numerous bookkeeping entries and 
accounts and testify as to the amount owing by the Appellant: 
(R. 212-214). The Appellants have contended in Point I of 
their brief that the Court abused its discretion in allowing 
this testimony. 
In considering this issue some background informa-
tion may be helpful. This action was filed in October of 
1977 (R. 144). In November of 1977 the Respondent answered 
the first set of interrogatories (R. 134) with information 
on the handling of the parts inventory following the 
termination of the dealership. Answer No. 1 indicated 
that complete records with respect to the parts return were 
available at the office of the Respondent's counsel and 
that they would be made available for examination or copyin~ 
at any convenient time. 
In December of 1977 a Request for Production of 
Documents (R. 131) was served by the Appellants. All of 
-6-
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the documents which had been gathered by the Respondent 
in support of its claim were made available to the Appellants 
in response to the Request for Production (R. 126). There-
after the depositions of Noel R. Critchfield, Delbert L. 
Homestead and Steven E. Parker were taken (R. 63) and they 
were examined with respect to the documents that had been 
produced. No further request for production was served and 
no motion for relief was made pursuant to Rule 37 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging a failure to produce 
available documents. 
At the time of the trial all of the documents 
which formed the basis for Mr. Homestead's conclusions 
(most of which had been previously copied by the Appellants) 
were present in the courtroom and were located upon the 
counsel table (R. 288, 292-297). And, Appellant Wayne 
Schoenfeld acknowledged in his testimony that prior to the 
initiation of the litigation Mr. Homestead had made the 
Respondent's records available to him and that he had gone 
through them (R. 321). 
These facts clearly distinguish the instant case 
from the situation in Gull Laboratories, Inc. v. Louis A. 
Roser Company, 589 P.2d 756 (Utah, 1978) which is cited by 
the Appellants. There it was held that the trial court 
had improperly admitted a summary since the original records 
from which the summary had been taken had not been made 
-7-
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available to the opposing parties and the court. In the 
Gull Laboratories case this Court quoted the following 
language from Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 4 utah 
2d 344, 294 P.2d 689 (1956): 
"It has been held, and we believe the 
ruling to be a salutary and expedient 
one, that where original book entries, 
documents or other data are so numerous, 
complex or cumbersome that they cannot 
be conveniently examined by the fact 
trier, or where it would materially aid 
the court and the parties in analyzing 
such material, that a competent person 
who has made such examination may 
present such evidence. This is subject 
to the limitation that the evidence must 
be shown to be developed from records, 
books, or documents, the competency of 
which has been established, the records 
must be ava1lable for exam1nation by the 
opposing parties, and the witnesses sub-
'ect to cross-examination concernin such 
Emphas1s added. 
The question of when and under what circumstances 
a summary of numerous documents can be received in evidence 
was settled when this Court adopted the Utah Rules of 
Evidence in 1971. Rule 70(1) (b) makes an exception to the 
best evidence rule, 
. when the original consists of 
numerous accounts or other documents which 
cannot be examined in court without great 
loss of time, and the evidence sought 
from them is only the general result of 
the whole." 
Rule 70(2) provides that, 
-8-
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"If evidence is to be admitted as 
provided in Paragraph (1) (b), the 
original shall be made available to the 
opponent for examination or copying, 
or both, at a reasonable time and placeJ 
and the judge may order that the originals 
be produced in court.n 
This sensible and necessary exception to the beat 
evidence rule has long been recognized. In Wigmore on 
Evidence Vol. 14, §1230 (1972 Ed.), Professor Wigmore 
points out that where the fact to be determined depends upon 
a large volume of documents, it is practically out of the 
question to have all of the documents go into evidence and 
to have to prove every item therein. 
"The convenience of trials demands that 
other evidence be allowed to be offered in 
the shape of the testimony of a competent 
witness who has perused the entire mass and 
will state summarily the net result. Such 
a practice is well established to be proper.n 
In Jones on Evidence, Vol. 2, §7:30 (1972) is the following: 
"Another exception to the best evidence 
rule, based upon necessity, arises when 
the primary source of proof consists of 
numerous documents which cannot be con-
veniently examined in court and the fact 
to be proved can only be ascertained by 
an examination of the whole collection. 
It is well established that in such a case 
a summary or the general result of the 
examination may be given in evidence by 
any person who has examined the documents 
and who is skilled in such matters, pro-
vided the result is capable of being 
ascertained by calculation." 
utah cases recognizing this exception to the best 
evidence rule go back as far as State v. Olsen, 75 Utah 583, 
-9-
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287 Pac. 181 (1930), and include the cases of Nalder v. 
Kellogg Sales Company 6 Utah 2d 367, 314 P.2d 350 (1957) 
and Shupe v. Menlowe, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246 (1966) 
which are cited by the Appellants. Statutory recognition 
of the exception is found in Utah Code Annotated 78-25-16{5) 
(1953), which permits evidence of the contents of a writing 
other than the writing itself to be received, 
"When the original consists of num<:!rous 
accounts or other documents which cannot 
be examined in court without great loss 
of time, and the evidence sought from 
them is only the general result of the 
whole." 
Permitting Mr. Homestead to summarize the volumi-
nous accounting records in this case and testify as to 
the amount owing by the Appellants as reflected therein 
was completely justifiable under the circumstances: 
1. Mr. Homestead was a responsible representative 
of the Respondent (District Operations 
Manager, R. 177) and he was thoroughly familiar 
with the records involved (R. 180-182, 292, 
293). 
2. The records were kept in the regular course 
of business and the originals of all of the 
monthly statements, invoices and other book-
keeping entries had been furnished to Pioneer 
at the time that they were prepared (R. 295-2 
-10-
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3. As documented above, the complete recorda on 
which Mr. Homestead's testimony was baaed 
had been made available to the Appellants on 
various occasions and they were available in 
court for use in cross-examination. As a 
matter of fact, counsel for the Appellants 
used some of the documents in connection with 
his cross-examination (R. 292-297) • 
4. The amounts testified to by Mr. Homestead 
were capable of being ascertained by calcula-
tion and consisted of the balance of the 
obligation after deducting all proper credits 
and certain questionable items (R. 211-214). 
POINT II 
THE AMOUNT OWING TO THE RESPONDENT BASED UPON 
FLOORING NOTES WAS PART OF THE TOTAL BALANCE 
REFLECTED IN THE VOLUMINOUS RECORDS INVOLVED 
IN THE CASE AND THE SUMMARY THEREOF BY RESPONDENT'S 
WITNESS WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE 
At the time that Pioneer resigned as an IHC dealer, 
it had approximately $400,000 worth of farm equipment inven-
tory which was covered by floor plan financing provided by 
IHCC (R. 472). Separate pieces of equipment were covered by 
separate wholesale notes and the status of all of the notes 
was summarized in a monthly statement sent by IHCC to the 
dealer (R. 180, 181). 
-11-
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Following the resignation of Pioneer, the farm 
equipment in the inventory was either sold to other IHC 
dealers (R. 205) or was resold to IHC (R. 207). Pioneer's 
account was credited with the freight charges that had been 
imposed when Pioneer purchased the equipment (R. 206) and 
the amount that Pioneer had paid for the equipment, less, 
in some cases, an agreed 3% handling charge (R. 207). 
The credits were applied to (1) a check from 
Pioneer in the amount of $3,877.27 which would not clear 
the bank; (2) $40,918.29 owing on equipment which had been 
sold but not paid for; and (3) to the notes covering the 
specific items which were either sold to other dealers or 
resold to IHC (R. 211, 212). After applying all of the 
credits the balance owing on the Wholesale Note and Inventory 
Statement was $4,311.81 (R. 212). This amount did not 
necessarily relate to specific notes, it was merely a net 
balance owing after applying all available credits to the 
total flooring obligation (R. 212). 
The summary of the transactions and the testimony 
of Mr. Homestead on the resulting balance clearly qualifies 
under the exception to the best evidence rule which is 
discussed in POINT I, above. The Appellants have contended 
in POINT II of their brief that the specific notes on which 
the $4,311.81 balance was based should have been ~laced in 
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evidence. However, the notes were numerous and the traa8-
actions through which they were cancelled were rather 
complicated. In view of the volume of documents involved 
the Court properly and prudently permitted Mr. Ba.estead 
to summarize the transactions and state the net result. 
Inasmuch as both POINTS I and II of the Appellants• 
Brief attack decisions made by the Trial Court in admitting 
evidence, it is worth reiterating that trial courts have 
been held to be entitled to" ••• some reasonable latitude 
of discretion" in rulings on the admission or the exclusion 
of evidence (In Re Baxter's Estate, 16 Utah 2d 284, 399 
P.2d 442 (1965)). Reversal is appropriate only if a clear 
abuse of discretion is shown (Martin v. Safeway Stores, 
565 P.2d 1139 (Utah, 1977). 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE DECISION 
OF THE TRIAL COURT WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN 
DISPUTED CHARGES RELATED TO RETAIL CONTRACTS 
PURCHASED BY THE RESPONDENT FROM PIONEER 
During the period of the business relationship 
between the Respondent and Pioneer, various problems arose 
in connection with retail contracts which had been purchased 
by the Respondent. Charges to Pioneer's account as a result 
of these problems were the subject of a good deal of 
conflicting testimony during the course of the trial. 
The Trial Court, after hearing the witness and considering 
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the documentary evidence, resolved the questions with respect 
to the disputed charges in favor of the Respondent. Inas-
much as the Trial Court had a chance to hear the witnesses 
and observe their demeanor first hand, the finding in favor 
of the Respondent should not be disturbed unless it is 
clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence (Wilcox v. 
Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1 (1936)). 
The purchase of retail contracts was one of the 
financing services offered to International Harvester 
dealers by the Respondent (R. 183). Contracts covering used 
equipment were purchased on a full recourse basis (R. 184) 
and contracts covering new equipment were purchased on a 
limited recourse basis, with a reserve account being 
utilized to absorb losses up to a certain limit in connectioc 
with repossessions (R. 183-185). 
"Exhibit E", which is a part of Exhibit 2, sets 
forth in detail the conditions under which retail contracts 
were purchased by the Respondent from Pioneer. The AppellG: 
have taken some portions of this agreement out of context 
and have used them in contending that the procedure 
followed by the Respondent in handling losses experienced 
in connection with retail contracts was not proper. As a 
matter of fact, when viewed in context, the agreement is 
clear and consistent and the handling of the retail contrac: 
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losses by the Respondent was in accordance with its terma. 
In view of the Appellants' attempt to focus the 
Court's attention on isolated portions of the agreement in 
question and to find ambiguities where none exist, several 
fundamental rules of interpreting contracts are worth 
mentioning: 
1. The intention of the parties is not to be 
determined from detached portions of the 
agreement. The intention should be ascertained 
by reading the agreement as a whole. 
(Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country Club, 
13 Utah 2d 160, 369 P.2d 928 (1962) and 
Thomas J. Peck and Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock 
Products, Inc. 30 Utah 2d 187, 616 P.2d 446 
(1973)). 
2. The concept of construing language in 
a contract most strongly against the party 
who used it is the last rule of construction 
to be resorted to and is only to be relied on 
where other rules of construction fail. 
(Simpson on Contracts §67, pp. 252, 253 (1954)) · 
In the case of Maw v. Noble, 10 Utah 2d 440, 
354 P.2d 121 (1960), the Court stated: 
"We are in agreement with the well-
recognized rule urged by the defendants 
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that where there is uncertainty or 
ambiguity the contract should be 
strictly construed against him who 
draws it. But it is to be kept in 
mind that this rule applies only where 
there is some genuine lack of certainty, 
and not to strained or merely fanciful or 
wishful interpretations that may be 
indulged in. The primary and a more 
fundamental rule is that the contract 
must be looked at realistically in the 
light of the circumstances under which 
it was entered into, and if the intent 
of the parties can be ascertained with 
reasonable certainty it must be given 
effect." 
With these principles in mind it is appropriate 
to review the pertinent provisions of the contract covering 
retail financing arrangements ("Exhibit E" to Exhibit 2): 
Paragraph A.l. - IHCC agrees to purchase retail contracts 
covering new and used equipment. 
Paragraph B.2. - The dealer warrants that contracts sold to 
IHCC will be free from defenses, offsets 
or counterclaims and that the goods covered 
thereby have been delivered. 
Paragraph B.3. -The dealer agrees to repurchase any contract 
with respect to which a warranty has been 
breached. 
Paragraph B.S. - The dealer consents, among other things, 
to compromises made by IHCC with retail 
customers. 
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Paragraph B.7. -Contracts covering used equipment are 
purchased on a full recourse basis. 
Paragraph C.B.(a) -A reserve account is established and 
is funded by depositing therein a percen-
tage of the applicable finance charge 
collected at the time that the contract 
is purchased. Gains realized on the resale 
of repossessed goods are also credited to 
the account. Losses experienced by IHCC 
on retail contracts are to be charged to 
the account. While the first sentence of 
Paragraph C. B. (a) (iv) does not mention 
repossessions, the other two sentences make 
it clear that the losses to be charged are 
those relating to "repossessed goods". 
Paragraph c. a. (b) - With respect to contracts purchased on 
a limited recourse basis, the amount 
charged to the reserve account or which 
must be paid by the dealer is limited to 
$1,000. 
The appellants have contended in POINT III of 
their Brief that all losses experienced by IHCC on retail 
contracts should have been charged to the reserve account 
and limited in amount to $1,000. However, a consideration 
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of the whole agreement in context, discloses that: 
1. Contracts covering used equipment were 
purchased on a fully guaranteed basis. 
2. The responsibility to charge the reserve 
account and the limitation on liability 
relate only to repossessions involving 
contracts on new equipment which were 
purchased on a limited recourse basis. 
Mr. Homestead explained this in his testimony (R. 184, 185) 
and the provisions of the contract fully support his 
testimony. 
With that analysis of the agreement in mind, it 
is appropriate to examine the disputed charges relating to 
retail contracts to determine whether they were properly 
handled. 
1. Myron Jones. Mr. Jones purchased an Interna-
tional tractor and traded in a Steiger tractor with the under· 
standing that an existing obligation covering the Steiger 
tractor would be paid by Pioneer and that he would be 
relieved of his liability thereon (R. 188, 189, 244). 
Pioneer failed to pay off the lien on the Steiger tractor 
and eventually Mr. Jones rescinded the transaction by 
returning the International tractor and taking his Steiger 
tractor back (R. 189, 190). As a result of the rescission, 
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the Pioneer open account was charged with a $2,500 retail 
delivery allowance that had been credited to it when the 
unit was sold to Mr. Jones and $1,006.86 in interest lost 
as a result of the rescission of the retail contract 
(R. 190). These amounts were reduced by a $1,790 credit, 
representing money received from Mr. Jones as compensation 
for the use of the tractor (R. 189). The net charge to the 
Pioneer account as a result of the rescission was $1,716.86. 
There was no obligation to charge this obliga-
tion to the Pioneer reserve account or to limit the charge 
to $1,000. The rescission arose out of a defense had by 
the customer, contrary to the dealer's warranty that no such 
defenses existed, and the charge did not relate to a 
repossession. 
2. Duane Taylor. Mr. Taylor purchased a tractor 
from Pioneer and the contract covering the unit was purchased 
by IHCC. When IHCC tried to get Mr. Taylor to make payments 
on the contract he contended that the true balance owing 
was considerably less than the amount shown on the contract 
(R. 191). In support of this contention Mr. Taylor supplied 
a different contract that he claimed was the one that he 
had signed and a check reflecting a $2,000 payment which the 
contract did not show (R. 192). Mr. Schoenfeld attempted 
to straignten the matter out but he was not successful in 
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doing so (R. 192). After a period of time IHCC concluded 
that the circumstances justified entering into a compromise 
settlement with Mr. Taylor (R. 192, 193). Mr. Schoenfeld 
was advised of the intention of IHCC to compromise the 
matter (R. 193) and, when he failed to object, IHCC agreed 
to reduce Mr. Taylor's balance by $2,832.46 {R. 193) and 
charged that amount to Pioneer's open account {R. 194). 
Charging the amount involved to the open account 
was correct because the adjustment was the result of a 
defense asserted by the customer and the retail financing 
agreement gave IHCC the right to enter into compromises. 
No repossession occurred and so the reserve account was not 
involved. 
3. William Branch. The Appellants do not contend 
in their Brief that the handling of the Branch transaction 
was improper. They only claim that the evidence did not 
support the charge. However, the matter was fully explained 
by Mr. Homestead {R. 194-196, 225, 226, 243). And, even 
though Mr. Schoenfeld took issue with some of the other 
charges, he presented no testimony at all on the Branch 
transaction. Thus, the testimony of Mr. Homestead was not 
disputed and it stands as the only evidence in the record 
on this matter. 
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4. Garth Sweeten and Sam Kogianes. In both of 
these cases the retail customers claimed the riqht to 
receive something in addition to what they had received at 
the time that they siqned the contracts which were sold 
by Pioneer to IHCC. Mr. Sweeten had not received a hitch 
(R. 196, 197) and Mr. Kogianes had been promised a wider 
grain platform (R. 197). In the case of the Koqianes 
problem Mr. Schoenfeld helped to remedy the problem (R. 199), 
and small charges were made to the Pioneer open account 
($599.03 in the case of the hitch and $431.63, representinq 
the cost of installing the new grain platform). 
Here again it is apparent that the amounts 
involved were properly charged to the open account. One 
of the warranties made by the dealer in the retail financinq 
agreement was that the goods covered by assigned contracts 
had been delivered. And, since no repossession occurred, 
there was no basis for charging the amounts involved to the 
dealer's reserve account. 
In short, all of the disputed charges relating 
to retail contracts were supported by the evidence and the 
procedure followed was consistent with the detailed 
provisions of the retail financing agreement. 
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POINT IV 
THE 3\ HANDLING CHARGE WHICH WAS IMPOSED 
IN CONNECTION WITH THE REPURCHASE OF FARM 
EQUIPMENT BY INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER 
WAS PROVIDED FOR BY CONTRACT AND WAS REASONABLE 
Following the resignation of Pioneer as an 
International Harvester dealer, representatives of both 
IHC and IHCC travelled to Spanish Fork to assist in 
processing Pioneer's inventory of farm equipment and parts. 
As much as possible of the equipment was sold directly to 
other IHC dealers (R. 262, 263). No handling charge was 
deducted in connection with these sales and Pioneer's 
account was credited for the full amount that had been charge: 
to it in connection with the purchase of the equipment, 
plus the freight charges that had been imposed (R. 263, 264). 
Equipment which could not be sold to other 
dealers was repurchased by IHC. On these purchases Pioneer's 
account was again credited with the full cost of the equip-
ment plus freight charges paid, less a 3% "handling charge" 
(R. 264, 265). 
In their Answer to the Respondent's Amended 
Complaint, the Appellants asserted the following affirmative 
defense: 
"The contract or contracts sued upon herein 
provide for penalties which should not be 
enforced by this court, and which bear no 
reasonable relationshiP to the out-of-pocket 
expenses incurred by the plaintiff or 
plaintiff's assignor." (R. 120). 
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At the time of the trial and in POINTS IV and v of their 
brief, the Appellants contended that the 3' handling 
charge imposed in connection with the repurchase of equipment 
by IHC was an unconscionable and an unenforceable penalty. 
In response to this contention the Respondent submits that, 
(1) the handling charge in question was specifically agreed 
to between the parties at the time that the dealership 
commenced; (2) actual costs incurred in connection with the 
repurchase far exceeded the modest handling charge, and 
(3) the evidence presented to show the actual out-of-pocket 
costs was competent and was properly received. 
The Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (Exhibit 1) 
which was entered into between the parties clearly spells 
out the procedure to be followed in connection with the 
termination of a dealership. Section 29 of the Agreement 
provides as follows: 
"Upon termination of the agreement, the 
Company agrees to repurchase, and the Dealer 
agrees to resell and deliver F.O.B. the 
Company's District Office, or other F.O.B. 
point agreed upon between the parties, all 
new, current, unused and salable tractors and 
machines, of the most current code announced 
by the Company, and equipment and at~achments, 
on hand in the Dealer's place of bus~ness 
that have been delivered to the Dealer under 
this and prior agreements. The prices to ~e 
paid by the Company shall be the dealer pr~ces 
at which they have been charged to the Dealer 
(but not more than the Company's current 
dealer prices) less all discounts allowed and 
less a handling charge of 3 per cent. In 
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addition, the Company will make an allow-
ance to the Dealer for freight on such 
goods based on the carload freight rates 
in effect on the date of termination from 
the factories where the goods were produced 
to the Dealer's town or the District Office, 
whichever is less." 
This provision of the Agreement was adhered to in every 
respect. The farm equipment was transported to the IHC 
depot in Clearfield, Utah (R. 264) and full credit was 
given to the dealer for the cost of the equipment plus the 
freight charges paid by the dealer in connection with its 
purchase of the equipment (R. 264, 265). The only deduc-
tion was the disputed 3% handling charge. 
Noel R. Critchfield, the area manager for IHC, 
supervised the repurchase of the equipment. He testified 
that approximately $306,000 worth of inventory was repur-
chased by IHC from Pioneer pursuant to the Dealer Sales and 
Service Agreement (R. 264). Applying the 3% handling 
charge to the inventory which was repurchased resulted in 
total handling charges of approximately $9,180. Anticipati~ 
the argument that these charges constituted an unenforceable 
penalty, the Respondent presented evidence showing some of 
the actual expenses incurred by IHC in connection with the 
repurchase of the equipment, including: 
$2,000.00 - Itemized out-of-pocket expenses of 
IHC employees involved in handling 
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the return of the equipment, 
including transportation, food and 
lodging (R. 267, 235, 236). 
$13,800.00- Cost to IHC of providing new credit 
te~s to dealers purchasing the 
equipment. An interest free period 
of at least six months is provided 
to dealers and the cost to IHC 
would be not less than $13,800.00 
(R. 270-273). 
$2,300.00 - Service fee incurred by IHC in 
connection with the resale of the 
equipment pursuant to regular whole-
sale flooring arrangements (R. 273-
274). 
$18,100.00- TOTAL 
In addition, there was testimony that substantial 
additional costs were incurred, including long distance 
telephone charges (R. 268, 269) and the wages of the people 
involved (R. 236, 237). Plaintiff's evidence clearly 
showed that the actual costs involved in connection with 
the repurchase of the inventory far exceeded the handling 
charge in question. 
The costs listed above were incurred by IHC, 
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the party repurchasing the equipment and imposing the 
handling charge. The terms of the repurchase were settled 
by the Agreement (Exhibit 1) between Pioneer and IHC. 
The only concern of Respondent IHCC with this process was 
to see that it occurred and that funds were generated 
thereby to apply to the substantial amount owing to it 
by Pioneer. The net amount resulting from the repurchase 
by IHC was applied to the Pioneer account. 
Since the disputed handling charge was imposed 
by IHC and the Appellants have not taken issue on appeal with 
the dismissal of their Third-Party Complaint against IHC, 
the issue really has no place in this appeal which involves 
only the claim of IHCC. 
Nevertheless, a brief additional discussion of 
several additional points may be in order. First, the 
Appellants have argued that the evidentiary support for the 
costs incurred by IHC was inadequate. The primary witness 
presenting testimony on the matter was Noel R. Critchfield. 
Mr. Critchfield is the area manager for IHC (R. 256) and, 
as such, he supervised and had direct responsibility for 
the repurchase and the eventual resale of the equipment whic 
was purchased from Pioneer, and the costs connected there-
with. No other person had more direct, first hand knowled~ 
of these facts than Mr. Critchfield. Rule 19 of the Utah 
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Rules of Evidence provides as follows: 
"As a prerequisite for the testimony of 
a witness on a relevant or material matter, 
there must be evidence that he has personal 
knowledge thereof, or experience, training 
or education if such be required.• 
Secondr the actual costs shown by the evidence 
are sufficient in amount as to eliminate any argument that 
the handling charge constituted a penalty. The pertinent 
cases only require that the out-of-pocket costs bear some 
reasonable relationship to the amount of the agreed 
charge: 
(1) Perkins v. Spencer, 112 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 
446 (1952) - the contractual charge will not 
be enforced where it is "unconscionable and 
exorbitant •.• bearing no relationship 
to the actual damages suffered." 
(2) Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah, 1977) -
enforcement denied where the liquidated 
damages are " grossly excessive and 
disproportionate to any possible loss." 
The undisputed evidence in this case clearly 
demonstrated that IHC incurred costs far in excess of the 
handling charge imposed in connection with the repurchase of 
equipment from the Pioneer inventory. Even if the Appellants' 
dispute was with IHC, they would have no basis for com-
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plaining about the small handling charge. The Respondent, 
IHCC, did not impose the charge in question and the question 
of whether it was justified has no place in an appeal of 
its judgment. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED 
ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO PERMIT 
A BELATED AMENDMENT OF THE PLEADINGS, 
PARTICULARLY SINCE THE EVIDENCE RELATING 
TO THE NEW THEORY WAS UNCLEAR AND UNCONVINCING 
In POINT VI of their Brief, the Appellants contend 
that the Trial Court should have permitted an amendment of 
the pleadings to conform to the evidence. Specifically, 
the Appellants contend that Exhibit No. 25 was shown during 
the trial to have been accepted by the parties as a valid 
agreement reflecting the liability of the Appellants to 
the Respondent. This contention is completely lacking in 
merit for a number of reasons. 
First, before an amendment to conform to the 
evidence is proper under Rule lS(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the issue not raised by the pleadings must 
have been, " ... tried by express or implied consent of 
the parties When the Appellants made their motion 
to amend at the close of the trial (R. 551) , counsel for 
the Respondent stated as fellows: 
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"Mr. Pugsley: I'd strenuously object, your 
Honor, I think that's a whole new theory of 
the case. It comes as a complete news to us 
that they intended to assert such a theory. 
I think it's absolutely improper to bring it 
in at this point." (R. 552) 
Thus, there clearly was no consent to including the 
affirmative defense of "novation" as an issue in the case. 
Rule B(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically 
requires that such affirmative defenses be pleaded. Where 
they are not and where, as here, the opposing party does 
not consent to the trial of the issue or to the amendment 
and asserts both surprise and prejudice in meeting the new 
issue, it is proper for the Trial Court to deny the motion 
to amend. 
In the case of National Farmers Union Property 
and Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249 
(1955), the Court upheld a ruling denying a party the right 
to rely on an issue not raised in the pleadings where there 
was no consent to try the issue. In doing so the Court 
stated that, 
"Notwithstanding all of our efforts to 
eliminate technicalities and liberalize 
procedure, we must not lose sight of the 
cardinal principle that under our system 
of justice, if an issue is to be tried 
and a party's rights concluded with 
respect thereto, he must have not~ce 
thereof and an opportunity to meet it." 
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This lanquaqe has been cited and relied upon by the Court 
on various occasions since the date of the National Farmers 
~ case (see e.g. Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 
226, 310 P.2d 517 (1957)). 
In one of the most recent decisions on the issue 
of a proposed amendment to conform to the evidence, Meyer 
v. Deluke, 123 Utah 2d 74, 457 P.2d 966 (1969), the Court 
upheld a ruling of the trial court denying a motion to 
amend on the ground that the defendants had known the facts 
at the time that they filed their answer but had failed to 
assert the affirmative defense. Under those facts the trial 
court was held to have discretion in denying the motion to 
amend and its decision to do so was upheld. 
In the instant case it was particularly appropriate 
for the motion to amend to be denied since the evidence 
with respect to the exhibit in question was confusing and 
conflicting and the exhibit does not on its face reflect a 
new agreement or a waiver of anything. 
In their brief the Appellants contend that 
Exhibit 25 constitutes a novation and a waiver of the 3% 
handling charge. There was no evidence that it represented 
any such thing. Defendant Wayne Schoenfeld testified 
that Exhibit 25 was prepared during a meeting with 
representatives of the IHC and IHCC and that the result 
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of the calculations was an agreed obligation to the Respondent 
of approximately $44,000 (R. 506, 507). This is substantially 
more than the Respondent is claiming. The second large 
page of Exhibit 25 was, according to Mr. Schoenfeld, pre-
pared and executed for the purpose of securing the $44,000 
obligation which was agreed upon (R. 507). It is remarkable 
that the Appellants contend that a document reflecting a 
$44,000 obligation (more than the Respondent's Judgment) was 
a novation, or a new contractual obligation which was 
substituted for an old one. There was no testimony with 
respect to payments thereon or a reduction of the obligation 
and, if Exhibit 25 was in fact a novation, the only alter-
native for the Trial Court would have been to have entered 
judgment in favor of the Respondent in the amount of 
$44,000. 
The testimony of Mr. Homestead on cross-examination 
with respect to the meeting with Mr. Schoenfeld or another 
one shortly thereafter was that the parties could not agree 
on the amount owing and that Mr. Schoenfeld disagreed with 
a number of the items that the Respondent was claiming. 
(R. 219, 220). 
Thus, the record with respect to Exhibit 25 was 
not clear. If it did represent a novation, the agreed 
obligation was well in excess of the amount claimed by the 
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Respondent in this suit. Under these circumstances, and 
particularly in view of the Respondent's strong objection 
to the proposed amendment to conform to the evidence, the 
Trial Court was clearly justified in refusing to permit 
the Appellants to rely on a new and novel theory which 
they had not pled and which the evidence did not support. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
INCLUDING AS PART OF THE JUDGMENT 
ENTERED HEREIN INTEREST IN THE 
AMOUNT OF $5,291.09 
The Trial Court found (R. 23) that interest on 
the principal amount of the claim in the amount of $5,291.09 
was supported by the evidence and the agreements entered 
into between the parties, and included this amount as part 
of the Judgment (R. 20) • 
The Respondent's claim to interest was based 
upon the provisions of the Schedule of Discounts and Terms 
which is a part of Exhibit 1. Page 4 of the Schedule 
includes the following language: 
"Interest owed on floor plan obligations 
will be assessed and due monthly. Before 
and after-maturity rates for the ensuing 
month will be determined in relation to the 
prime rate in effect at four of seven 
specified New York City banks on the third 
Monday of the current month. The before-
maturity rate will be one and one-half 
(1 l/2) percent and the aftec-maturity rate 
will be three and one-half (3 l/2) percent 
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over the prime rate. The ~n~ rates 
established by the Company are eight (8) 
percent before maturity and ten (10) 
percent after maturity. If the interest 
rates determined as set forth herein 
exceed rates permitted by law, then the 
highest rates permitted by law shall apply. 
The after-maturity rate determined by the 
preceding paragraph shall apply for calcu-
lating interest due on open-account obliga-
tions not paid at maturity.• 
The Respondent's principal witness, Delbert L. 
Homestead, testified with respect to the calculation of 
interest based upon the language of the Agreement. His 
testimony (R. 216, 217) was that the interest had been 
calculated on the basis of 3 1/2% over the prime rate, 
that the dealer had been advised monthly of the interest rate 
that applied for that month and tha~ applying the applicable 
interest rates for the period in question to the principal 
amount of the obligation of the Appellants, interest in the 
amount of $5,291.09 was due. Appellants' counsel failed 
to cross-examine with respect to this testimony and no evi-
dence was offered tending to call into question the way 
that the interest was calculated or the amount of the interest 
due. 
It is remarkable that the Appellants contend that 
the interest rate to be applied to the open account obliga-
tion was not specified. The language of the Agreement 
which is quoted above specifically applies the interest rate 
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used by Mr. Homestead to n .•• open-account obligations 
not paid at maturity.n 
In view of the fact that the written agreement 
between the parties expressly provides for interest and the 
interest calculation of the only witness who testified 
with respect to the matter was made in specific compliance 
with the contractual provision, there is simply no basis 
for the Appellants to complain about this part of the 
Judgment. The dates when the obligations became due on the 
flooring financing and the open account were covered by the 
testimony of Mr. Homestead (R. 181, 182). 
Having established the dates when the obligations 
became due, the rate of interest agreed to between the 
parties and the principal amount to which the interest 
applied, the calculation of the amount of interest due was 
a simple matter and, as indicated above, the testimony of 
Mr. Homestead thereon was neither challenged through cross-
examination nor called into question by any contrary 
evidence. The interest could be and it was calculated 
with certainty and it thus satisfied the cases cited by 
the Appellants, including Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 
32 Utah 101, 88 Pac. 1003 (1907), Anderson v. State Farm 
Fire and Casualty Co., 583 P.2d 101 (Utah, 1978) and 
Uintah Pipeline Corporation v. White Superior Company, 546 
P.2d 885 (Utah, 1976). 
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In view of the Appellants' attempt to avoid the 
payment of interest which was specifically agreed to by 
contract, the following language from the case of Farnsworth 
v. Jensen, 117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d 571 (1950) seems appropriate 
for consideration: 
"Conventional interest in the ordinary 
acceptation of the term is such interest 
as the parties to a contract have agreed 
upon as part of their contract, and is 
as much an integral part of the debt as 
the principal itself: and while it forms 
an element in computing the amount of 
recovery, it does so in the way that a 
provision of the contract limiting liability, 
or any other contractual provision as to 
the amount involved in the contract, does•. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION IN STRIKING THE APPELLANTS' DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL AND IN PROCEEDING TO HEAR AND 
DECIDE THE MATTER WITHOUT A JURY 
POINT VIII of the Appellants' Brief contends at 
the start that it was error for the Trial Court to deny them 
a trial by jury. In the discussion of the matter, however, 
the Appellants concede that the case had "equitable aspects" 
and that " a jury could have acted in an advisory 
capacity .. 
The Appellants filed a Request for Jury Trial on 
May 24, 1978 (R. 106). On June 19, 1978 the Respondent 
filed a Motion to Strike (R. 94) and a Memorandum in Support 
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(R. 95). Contrary to Rule 2.8{b) of the Rules of Practice 
in the District Courts, the Appellants failed to file 
answering points and authorities and, on August 21, 1978, 
the Motion was granted {R. 65). 
Rule 38{a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that, 
"The right of trial by jury as declared by 
the Constitution or as given by statute 
shall be prese.!"ved to the parties." 
Thus, the right to a jury trial must be predicated upon a 
constitutional provision or a statute. Article I Section 10 
of the Constitution of Utah provides as follows: 
"In capital cases the right of trial by jury 
shall remain inviolate. In courts of general 
jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury 
shall consist of eight jurors. In courts 
of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist 
of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict 
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A 
jury, in civil cases, shall be waived unless 
demanded." 
While this provision recognizes that there are civil actions 
in which a jury may be demanded, it does not by its terms 
guarantee a jury trial, as a matter of right, in civil 
actions. That right remains "inviolate" only in "capital 
cases". Therefore, the right to a jury trial in civil 
cases is neither an absolute matter of right nor is it 
conferred by the Constitution. Since the language of the 
Utah jury trial provision does net specifically require a 
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right to jury trial, the requirement should not be created 
by implication. See, Degnan, Right to Civil Trial in Utaha 
Constitution and Statute, 8 Utah L. Rev. 97, 121-22 (1962). 
The other basis for a jury trial provided for in 
Rule 38(a) is "by statute". Utah Code Annotated 578-21-1 
(1953) provides: 
"In actions for the recovery of specific 
real or personal property, with or without 
damages, or for money claimed as due upon 
contract or as damages for breach of contract, 
or for injuries, an issue of fact ma~ be tried 
by a jury, unless a jury trial is wa1ved or a 
reference is ordered. [Emphasis added.] 
By its terms, the statute is permissive rather than mandatory 
because it states that certain types of action •may be 
tried by a jury" and not that they must be as a matter of 
right. 
Under the pertinent decisions of this Court, the 
matter of whether a jury trial is appropriate depends on 
the nature of the primary issues involved in the case. 
The clearest statement of the fundamental rule in Utah is as 
follows: 
"If the issues are legal or the major issue 
legal, either party is entitled upon proper 
demand to a jury trial; but, if the issues 
are equitable or the major issues to be 
resolved by an application of equity, the 
legal issues being merely subsid~ary, the 
action should be regarded as equ1table and 
the rules of equity apply." 
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Norback v. Board of Directors of Church Extension Soc., 
84 Utah 514, 37 P.2d 339 (1934). The court reaffirmed 
this rule in Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327 P.2d 250 
(1958). 
The issues in the instant case are such that the 
defendants were not entitled to a jury trial. The action 
was initiated for the purpose of recovering a deficiency 
following an agreed procedure which in essence was a 
foreclosure. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that actions 
for 
"the foreclosure of mortgages . . . were 
historically and traditionally equitable 
n 
Petty v. Clark, 102 Utah 186, 129 P.2d 568, 572 (1942). 
In that same case, the court said: 
"The cases in Utah are definite. They 
explicitly hold that in a foreclosure 
suit on a note and a mortgage the issue 
of indebtedness is not triable by a jury 
as a matter of right." Id. at 574. 
In Consolidated Wagon & Machine Co. v. Kay, Bl Utah 595, 
21 P.2d 836 (1933), a case which is markedly similar to the 
instant suit, the court held: 
"Under statutes such as we have and as 
generally obtain in other jurisdictions, 
a necessary part or basis of a mortgage 
is a debt or other obligation to secure 
the payment or performance of which the 
mortgage is given. When the debt or 
obligation is denied, proof thereof lS 
essential to the right of foreclosure, 
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and, if the debt or other obliqation 
falls, the mortqaqe falls. Here the 
mortqage was given to secure the payment 
of what then remained due and unpaid on 
the co~tract of purchase of the machinery, 
~ount~ng to $1,183. By the complaint it 
~s alleged that thereafter there was paid 
on the indebtedness $243, leaving a balance 
due and unpaid in the sum of $963. That 
balance so remaining due and unpaid was 
denied. It also is denied that the mortqaqe 
was given for a good consideration, and it 
was alleged that it was given without 
consideration. All that related to the 
right of foreclosure itself. Though the 
pleaded affirmative defenses in character 
were legal, yet they no more prevented or 
relieved the court from determining the whole 
issue than if the defendant had pleaded 
payment or non est factum. Because as to 
the pleaded defenses the burden of proof was 
cast on the defendants, again no more 
relieved the court from the duty and respon-
sibility of determing the whole issue than if 
a plea of payment or of confession and avoid-
ance had been interposed. We therefore are 
of the opinion that no error was comm~tted in 
the court's ruling dismissing the jury and 
in determinin the whole issue resented b 
the plead~ngs." [Emphas~s added. 
Despite the fact that the Consolidated Wagon case 
preceded the passage of the Uniform Commercial Code in Utah, 
it is still applicable. While the present suit is based 
upon a security agreement, the term "security agreement" is 
nothing more than a new term under the Uniform Commercial 
Code to cover a variety of older interests, the chattel 
mortgage being among them. (See, Utah Code Annotated 70A-9-102 
(2) (1953)). 
-39-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Finally, in State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey, 565 
P.2d 413 (Utah, 1977) the court held that "the trial court 
did not err in ruling defendants were not entitled to a 
jury trial ••• " in an action to foreclose a security 
interest in both real and personal property. The court 
once again noted that the action was equitable. 
It was clearly within the discretion of the Trial 
Court to deny the Appellants' request for a jury trial 
(Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d 
126 (1966)). Both the Respondent's claim and the Appellants' 
defenses were essentially equitable in character and, under 
those circumstances, the Court's decision to hear and 
decide the case without the aid of a jury was justified 
and should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
This rather complicated case was presented to the 
Trial Court over a period of several days. Extensive 
testimony and numerous exhibits were presented in evidence. 
The Trial Court had the benefit of memoranda from both 
sides covering a number of legal and factual issues. The 
record on appeal does not contain and the Appellants' 
Brief fails to point out any legally sufficient basis for 
overturning any of the findings and conclusions made by the 
Trial Court or for granting a new trial. 
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The decision which was entered was supported by 
the evidence and the law and the Judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
International Harvester Credit 
corporat1on 
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